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Editor’s key points
† Reliable incident reporting
and dissemination of
learning improves patient
safety.
† Establishing a ‘no blame’
safety culture and
ensuring legal protection
will encourage greater
incident reporting.
† Standardizing definitions,
benchmarking, and
closing the patient safety
loop are important steps
in this process.
Background. Critical incident reporting is a key tool in the promotion of patient safety in
anaesthesia.
Methods.We surveyed representatives of national incident reporting systems in six European
countries, inviting information on scope and organization, and intelligence on factors
determining success and failure.
Results. Some systems are government-run and nationally conceived; others started out as
small, specialty-focused initiatives, which have since acquired a national reach. However,
both national co-ordination and specialty enthusiasts seem to be necessary for an optimally
functioning system. The role of reporting culture, definitional issues, and dissemination is
discussed.
Conclusions. We make recommendations for others intending to start new systems and
speculate on the prospects for sharing patient safety lessons relevant to anaesthesia at
European level.
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Critical incidentreporting isakeycomponentofpatientsafety.1 2
Experience from risk management in other industries suggests
that safety can be improved by learning from accidents and
near misses. Optimal management of errors requires organiza-
tions to learn from the threats to safety, identify the underlying
causes, and seekout opportunities for change.3 Commonly, this
involves the introduction of incident reporting systems (IRSs)
which enable front-line staff to communicate their safety con-
cerns and experiences of error to those responsible for safety
and quality. These incident reports then provide organizations
withthe informationneededtomakeproactiveremedialchanges
to practice. Furthermore, there is often a great deal to learn from
important individual reports.
Four key componentsmust be optimized for IRSs to achieve
their potential:1 Data input must be encouraged with a non-
punitive culture; the data themselves are best gathered by
free text to allow as much detail as possible; data analysis
needs time and expertise to turn the report into a ‘lesson’;
and feedback is essential not only to change practice but also
to encourage further reporting. Reporting systems have been
organized at a variety of levels: within individual departments
of anaesthesia, within individual hospitals, at regional level,
and at national level. While immediate analysis and feedback
areessential at local level,widedisseminationof safety lessons
can improve patient care on a larger scale. However, many
countries do not yet have national systems for reporting
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incidents arising from anaesthesia and critical care, and there
is alsonoEuropeanplatformfor sharing the lessons fromthose
countries thatdo. In this study, ouraimwasto compare thedif-
ferent IRSs operating in these European countries with a view
to gathering intelligence which might help others establish
new systems.
In addition, we aimed to bring together those whomight in
future collaborate to share the lessons learnt from incidents at
European level.
Methods
A standardized questionnaire was sent out to representatives
of nationally organized IRSs, which include reporting about
anaesthesia insixEuropeancountries. Thequestionnaire invited
free text responses on more than 30 questions grouped under
seven headings (Table 1). We asked how and when systems
started operating, how they were funded and publicized, and
how they linked into local and other national systems. We also
asked for data on the number of incidents and the processes
of analyses and feedback, before inviting recommendations to
thoseconsideringestablishingsimilarsystemsinotherEuropean
countries. We sent this questionnaire to representatives in
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Spain, Switzerland, and the UK, as
we were aware from preliminary work that these countries
had national systems for incident reporting. Responses were
analysed within the themes set out in the data collection tool
and,specifically,adviceforsettingupnewsystemswasextracted
separately.
Results
The results of the enquiry are summarized and compared in
Table 2. Detailed intelligence about each national system is
presented below, in alphabetical order.
Denmark
The Danish National Board of Health raised the need for a
patient safety IRS in 1997, but did not receive any support
until after the publication of To Err is Human by the US Institute
of Medicine in 1999.4 A report from the Danish Institute for
Health Services5 showed that patient safety was similar to
the situations in Australia, the UK, and NewZealand, where in-
cident reporting was already developing. However, the elec-
tronic reporting systems were not quite suited to the Danish
context and it was necessary to design a new one. Patient
safety laws were passed in 2003, meaning that incidents are
reported to the national patient safety reporting system in
both public and private practice. In 2010, this was extended
to include pharmacies, pre-hospital care, and the municipal
health service. The online system was launched nationally in
2004, includes all incidents in all specialities, and is funded by
the national budget (E1 000 000 per year). Each hospital is
required to have at least one safety representative in each de-
partment and between one and three patient safety man-
agers. At regional level there is a patient safety unit with
between five and ten managers. Nationally at the central au-
thority (the Danish National Agency for Patients’ Rights and
Complaints or Patientombuddet), four full-time employees
(two medical doctors, one nurse, and one pharmacist) are
running the system and are disseminating learning nation-
wide.Anyonecan report incidentsusing thesystem—including
members of the public from 2011—although the public does
not have access to the reports.
It is an extensive system in all hospitals with 140 285 cases
(2004–2011) and in its second incarnation 156 000 cases
(2010 until June 2012), a total of 296 285 reports.
Currently the system receives more than 150 000 reports in
a year. After de-identification and local processing, the inci-
dents are analysed at national level by the Danish National
Agency for Patients’ Rights and Complaints, which is respon-
sible for disseminating learning nationwide. This is done using
alerts, monthly newsletters, themed reports, annual reports,
and by arranging ‘awareness’ days on specific themes. No
regular/systematic analysis of the database is carried out.
However, based on alerts from, for example, safety managers
and safety representatives and special focus areas, specific
analyses are carried out. Built-in search terms trigger an
alarm in incidents of particular concern. Any publications
using the database as a source are required to report their re-
search findings to the central authority.
Since 2004, the central authority has issued 30 warnings
about procedures/workflows posing a risk to patient safety
and18major theme reports. TheDanish systemshares its find-
ings internationally via the Global Patient Safety Alerts within
the World Health Organization.6
In 2006, the systemwas formally evaluated: it was found to
be well implemented and used but many healthcare profes-
sionals felt a lack of time to report and a lack of knowledge
about what to report, and it was concluded that the system
was not being used as effectively as it could be. The poor indi-
vidual feedback to the reporter and the long lag time to follow-
up with safety intervention were also highlighted. This led to
changes in the law in 2010, which has since improved incident
reporting in Denmark.
Finland
The IRS in Finland, HaiPro,was also developed after the publica-
tionofTo Err is Human in1999.4 It startedasapilotproject inone
hospital—Helsinki University Hospital—in 2005, where 210
incidents were reported in a 4-month period. The system was
gradually rolled out across the country in 2007 and now covers
90–95% of hospitals in Finland and all specialties. Each hos-
pitaldistrictpays for itsownHaiPro.AlthoughHaiPro isanational
system, the reporting and resulting actions after the incidents
take place at local level. Reporting is anonymous.
HaiPro is anonline systemaiming tocapture all incidents and
near misses with patient care, medications, and equipment
anonymously within a ‘no blame’ culture. It is funded by the
hospitals using it. By December 2012, more than 200 000 inci-
dents from all specialities and all sections of healthcare, over
the whole country, had been reported by clinical staff. Only in
a few instances, has the report been filled out by a patient,
assisted by a member of the nursing staff. Currently, the data
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are analysed only within the hospital where they are reported,
and the impact remains local, although this is currently being
reviewed so that the educational value of such a system can
be improved. The incident reports in HaiPro are fed back at
monthly meetings in the anaesthesia units; they are not pub-
lished anywhere. The official number of HaiPro reports in
2012 from the Helsinki University Hospital district, employing
20 000 healthcare professionals, was 10 121. The number
reported from the department of anaesthesiology and the in-
tensive care unit was 951 (9.3%). Overall, the most common
categorical reason for reporting incidents was errors or near
misses in medication and various types of i.v. fluid therapy.
These made up 42% of all reports filed by staff working in an-
aesthesiology, intensive care, and surgical units. The second
most common reasonwas failure in communication and lead-
ership (25%).
Feedback on the system is very positive. Initially, it was
mainly the nursing staff that were using the system, but after
several initiatives andpatient safety projects (including the ini-
tiation of a national patient safety strategy for 2009–2013),
doctors are nowengagingwith the systemmore. This strategy,
elaborated by the Ministry for Social Affairs and Health, aimed
to embed patient safety into the structures and practices
in healthcare through involving patients, proper resourcing,
and encouraging reporting of, and learning from, problems.
Finland has had some difficulties with connecting and linking
individual databases from different hospitals in the past,
which is what led to HaiPro being conceived as it stands.
Table 1 Data collection prompts
History and development
How did the idea for a national (anaesthetic) reporting system start?
When did it start?
How did you publicize the system when it was starting up?
Did it start small and grow or did you aim for a national launch?
Current status
Does the system cover critical/intensive care? Emergency medicine? Perioperative care?
Do you have funding for the system?Where does it come from? Howmuch is it per year?
How have funding arrangements changed since you started the system?
What form does the reporting system take (paper based, online, both, other)
Do you have a definition for users of the system of what is reportable? Or what is excluded?
What percentage of hospitals in your country is now taking part?
Howmany incidents are now in the database?
How do you manage the balance between confidentiality and identifiability?
Relationships with other systems
How does the system link to other local or national reporting systems (for instance, for reporting drug-related problems)?
Are these systems competing in some way or co-operative?
In the case of local departments of anaesthesia or hospitals, are incidents discussed/responded to locally as well as being submitted nationally?
Is there any sort of filtering/quality control locally before incidents are submitted to the national system?
Patient and public involvement
Is the general public and/or patient representatives, involved in any way in the running of the system?
Can members of the public/patients report incidents?
Are they involved in analysis or feedback?
Access and analysis
Are the incidents in the database analysed in any way?
Are the materials publicly accessible?
Can the database be searched by others—anaesthetic society members, the general public, researchers?
Feedback, outputs, impacts, pros, and cons
How do you feed back the learning from reported incidents to anaesthetists (e.g. rapid-response alerts about especially dangerous incidents,
summaries on society websites, emails to members, newsletters, peer-reviewed publications, etc.)?
Have any publications resulted from the database?
What practical impacts/‘success stories’ have you had (media coverage, enquiries from other specialties, evidence of change of practice, feedback
from colleagues, downloads of documents/website hits, etc.)?
Has your system been formally evaluated in any way?
General
What problems/difficulties have you had?
What advice would you give to anyone planning to set up a system from the beginning?
Is there anything else you would like to add, or anything else you would like the article to say about your system?
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Table 2 Comparison of key characteristics of European IRSs; see text under individual countries for definitions of abbreviations
UK Spain Germany Denmark Finland Switzerland
When did it
start?
2008 2009 2006 specialty specific;
integrated into the national
system in 2009
2004 2005 1998
2006—online joint
system established
Associated
organizations
RCoA, AAGBI, NPSA Spanish Ministry of Health DAGI, BDA, BA¨K, KBV and A¨ZQ SSAR/SGAR, Patient
Safety Foundation in
Switzerland
Funding UK NHS Government grants and
industry support
Individual hospitals Danish Government Individual hospitals SSAR/SGAR, PSF,
hospitals, and cantons
Other incident
report systems
Overall system run by NRLS New national IRSs—at pilot
stage
Adverse drug events
CIRSmedical.de—nationwide
anonymous IRS—now fully
integrated
Encompasses all
incidents—not
anaesthesia specific
Encompasses all
incidents—not
anaesthesia specific
Aims tocapture All anaesthetic-related incidents All anaesthetic-related
incidents
All incidents All incidents All incidents All incidents including
near misses
‘Roll-out’
strategy
3-month pilot of 12 hospitals
before national roll-out
Pilot in 16 hospitals then
rolled out to others slowly
Allhospitalswanting tobepart
of the system have to send a
representative to a training
day
Nationwide Pilot in one hospital,
then rolled out to
others
Pilot in 24 hospitals,
currently in 43
hospitals
Coverage National 70 of 800 hospitals
currently
National—but only 64
hospitalspaying for theservice
currently
National 90–95% of hospitals 15% of hospitals
currently
Who can
report?
Healthcare professionals Healthcare professionals Healthcareprofessionals—but
thegeneral public can read the
de-identified incidents online
Anyone Healthcare
professionals—but
patients can ask them
to fill out a report
Healthcare
professionals
Are the
incidents
analysed?
By consultant anaesthetists if
submitted by e-Form
By anaesthetists—locally Depends on hospital—2
different packages—none, or
analysis by multidisciplinary
team
Yes; depth depends on level
of analysis (local/regional/
national)
Local hospital analysis Local hospital analysis
Feedback
strategy
Quarterly summary unless high
impact incident
Individual—unique
number
Local—email alerts
National—rapid-response
emails, summaries, and
newsletter
‘Case of the month’—
interesting case
Special—frequently reported
incidents
Via weekly mortality
reports from the national
data
Different areas of focus
identified at local level
Monthly local
departmental
meetings
Via Quick-Alerts—
published in specialist
journals and PSF
website
Number of
incidents
reported
1004 in 4 yr More than 2800 in 3 yr 2700 in 6 yr 296 285 cases in 8 yr
(now 10 000 reports
yearly)
More than 100 000
in 7 yr
More than 3000
reports in 8 yr
Any
difficulties?
(i) Not all information required by
individual trusts to investigate
incidents is collected so some
additional work is required by risk
management
(ii) The government body
responsible for inception and
development has been closed
(i) Lack of funding—unable
to use national staff for
formal evaluation of
incidents
(ii) Slow—but steady—
introduction across the
country
(iii) Spanish law does not
protect reporters—has
been tackled
Initial concern over
confidentiality and fear of
sanctions—high levels of
confidentiality and server
security has addressed this
Formal evaluation led to
identification of problems
with knowledge of what to
report, and finding time to
fill out the report
This was addressed via a
change to the law in 2010
(i) Nursing staff engage
more thanphysicians—
being addressed by
several initiatives
(ii) HaiPro developed
because of difficulty
connecting individual
hospitals IRSs
(i) Funding became an
issue as the system
grew—further funding
channels identified
(ii) Not currently in all
hospitals nationwide
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In any case, as each hospital and healthcare centre already
has, or will have its own HaiPro officer (usually a clinical staff
nurse), itwill bepossible to receivemoredetailedandspeciality-
related aggregated summaries of incidents in the next few
years.
Germany
The German Society for Anaesthesiology and Intensive Care
[Deutsche Gesellschaft fu¨r Ana¨sthesiologie und Intensivmedi-
zin (DGAI)] and the Association of German Anaesthetists
[Berufsverband Deutscher Ana¨sthesisten (BDA)] endorsed the
nationwide implementation of a web-based specialty-specific
reporting and learning system, the Patient SafetyOptimisation
System (PaSOS), which was developed by the Patient Safety
Centre in Tu¨bingen (Tu¨PASS) in 2006.7 This system was felt to
be practical and user friendly and was repeatedly publicized
in the journal of the DGAI and BDA.
In 2006, the Federal Medical Council [Bundesa¨rztekammer
(BA¨K)] and the national Association of Statutory Health Insur-
ance Physicians [Kassena¨rztliche Bundesvereinigung (KBV)]
commissioned theGermanAgency forQuality inMedicine [A¨rz-
tliches Zentrum fu¨r Qualita¨t in der Medizin (A¨ZQ)] to develop a
parallel system. In addition, they asked the Agency to manage
and develop the web-based reporting system ‘CIRSmedical.de’
intoanational interdisciplinary reportingand learningnetwork—
ananonymousnational database of incidents.8 9 Theexecutive
committees of the BDA and DGAI decided in 2009 to integrate
PaSOS into ‘CIRSmedical.de’, leading to one nationwide
specialty-specific IRS after 2 yr of them running in parallel. At
present, the IRS for anaesthesia and critical care, ‘CIRS-AINS’,
is a subsystem of ‘CIRSmedical.de’.
The systemcanbe used in twoways: as a free access report-
ing system—without the need to register—and as an internal
reportingsystemaccessibleonly tomembersof specificanaes-
thesia departments. In the latter case, identification is granted
via an individual Internet portal (IP) address andpasswordand
hospitals pay a monthly fee. At the moment, 79 hospitals use
the system and have reported more than 3000 cases from
2006 to March 2013. The report form is a combination of
check boxes and free text boxes which cover all areas of prac-
tice relevant to anaesthesia—perioperative care, intensive
care, pain management and, pre-hospital emergency medi-
cine. The only compulsory field is the nature of the incident.
The database can be searched using free text terms to find
incidents of interest.8 At least one member of staff from each
hospital must have attended a 1-day training course before
the hospital is able to use the system. Financing of the
system is shared byBDA/DGAIand byusers: BDAandDGAI pro-
videdfinancing for softwaredevelopment and foranyupdates,
whereas running costs are funded by individual hospitals. The
subscription fee is basedon thenumberof physicians in thede-
partment and on what services the hospital wants from the
system, and varies from 12E to 510E per month. The hospital
is issued with a ‘starter kit’—a series of PDFs—which includes
pre-written letters to nursing and medical directors encour-
aging incident reporting and ensuring the absence of
sanctions. In February 2013, the German government passed
a law (the so-called ‘Patientenrechtegesetz’) which, for the
first time in German history, grants legal protection of health-
care professionals who submit data into local or national
reporting systems.
These reports are analysed by the German Agency for
Quality in Medicine (A¨ZQ) in Berlin and a staffed office of
DGAI and BDA in Nuremberg. A¨ZQ provides the server (a high-
security server in Switzerland), keeps contactwith the software
developer, manages the website, and gets in contact with in-
dustry where necessary. DGAI and BDA contact participants,
anonymize reports, and distribute the reports to a member of
an interdisciplinary team of experts who will provide analysis.
Depending on the package paid for this may be a basic
summary, or may be a thorough analysis by anaesthetists, an
interdisciplinary team of experts and a legal team. The inci-
dents are then published on two websites, which can be
accessed by anyone with an Internet connection. They are
also published in the journal Ana¨sthesiologie and In-
tensivmedizin, in PDF format via the website as ‘Case of
the Month’ and as an extended analysis of frequently reported
cases.Thefrequently reportedcases—‘CIRS-AINSspecialcases’—
are made accessible to all physicians in Germany via publica-
tion in the German Journal for Evidence and Quality in Health-
care [Zeitschrift fu¨r Evidenz, Fortbildung und Qualita¨t im
Gesundheitswesen (ZEFQ)].10 11While critical incident reporting
system (CIRS)-AINSasan internal reportingsystem isaccessible
only to members of specific anaesthesia departments, unre-
stricted reading by the public is allowed for the free access
reporting system. In principle, all cases from the internal report-
ingsystemare transferred in full tothe freeaccesssystemunless
therespectivedepartmentvetoes itspublication.Thereportsare
cleansed of features that could provide clues to identifying
departments or hospitals.
Spain
January 2009 saw the introduction of the ‘Sistema Espan˜ol de
Notificacio´n en Seguridad en Anestesia y Reanimacio´n’
(SENSAR), which had developed from the University Hospital
Fundacio´nAlcorco´nAnaesthesiaDepartment Incident Report-
ing System (IRS),12 a hospital web-based Microsoft Access
databaseTM that started in 1999. The pilot of the online web-
based SENSAR started in two hospitals in 2008 and then was
expanded to 16 hospitals that founded the SENSAR society.
The Spanish Society of Anaesthesia (Sociedad Espan˜ola de
Anestesiologı´a y Reanimacio´n) and the Patient Safety Agency
of the Spanish Ministry of Health endorsed the system. Since
February 2009, the number of hospitals involved has grown
and the system is now used in 70 of 800 Spanish hospitals. It
covers all areas of anaesthesia from preoperative through to
postoperative care and pain management, and has collected
more than 2800 incidents since 2009. It is funded by govern-
ment grants and industry support.
SENSAR is confidential and anonymous–each anaesthetic
department is supplied with a generic user name and pass-
word—the database does not track via IP address or other
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identifyingmarkers as Spanish lawdoesnot protect the report-
er. For this reason, incidents cannot be traced back for further
analysis. Local analysis of the incidents by anaesthetists from
the same department follows a common methodology13 and
departments can search the database for similar incidents.
The members’ section of the SENSAR website distributes
alerts, guidelines, and discussion of incidents along with
more general patient safety information.
Feedback is given in three different ways:
(1) Individual unique incident report numbers are issued to
the reporter, who can then use this to look at the ana-
lysis and recommendations.
(2) Local safetycommitteesprovide localemailalerts to the
anaesthetists in the department.
(3) National rapid-response emails, SENSAR website sum-
maries, newsletters, peer-reviewed publications, and
conference meetings.
Multiple publications have come from SENSAR including the
Spanish Guidelines for Labelling of Injectable Drugs used in An-
aesthesia14 and a special patient safety educational issue of
the national anaesthesia journal, Revista Espan˜ola de Aneste-
siologia y Reanimacio´n.15
The Spanish Ministry of Health has recently launched a na-
tional general IRS that has just finished its pilot stage, and
there is a national adverse drug reaction reporting system
thathasexisted for15yr. SENSAR is lookingat thecompatibility
between all these systems for the future. The main success of
SENSAR is that it has brought patient safety to the minds of
anaesthetists in Spain. Budget restrictions have prevented a
dedicated national staff being employed by the system, al-
though the slow and steady introduction across the country
of SENSARmaychange this in the future. National and regional
meetings are being planned to support the departments new
to SENSAR, and those falling behind, through the experience
of the most successful ones.
Switzerland
Switzerland’s Foundation for Patient Safety in Anaesthesia
(Stiftung fu¨r Patientensicherheit in der Ana¨sthesie) at the
Swiss Society for Anaesthesiology and Reanimation [Socie´te´
suisse d’anesthe´siologie et de reanimation/Schweizerische Ge-
sellschaft fu¨r Ana¨sthesiologie (SSAR/SGAR)] has been main-
taining a national CIRS since 1998,16 based on the local
development of a systemat theUniversity of Basel using Inter-
net technology (CIRS) as long ago as 1997.
Progressatnational levelwashamperedbytheneedtohave
the same electronic reporting system locally available in order
to participate at the national system, asmore andmore hospi-
tals developed their own reporting system locally. The Patient
Safety Foundation in Switzerland, a nationwide organization,
stepped in and offered a partnership with the SSAR/SGAR to
develop a national IRS that allowed data input from various
local reporting schemes. Together they developed Critical Inci-
dentReportingandReactingNETwork (CIRRNET) in2006.17 The
project ismainly funded by the Patient Safety Foundation, with
support from SSAR/SGAR, participant institutions, and the
Swiss cantons.
The pilot project involved 24 hospitals with anaesthetic
departments; thiswasexpanded in2009 toallmedical depart-
ments (not just anaesthesia departments) of the hospitals
involved. Currently, 43 hospitals (15% of Swiss hospitals)
are part of CIRRNET. Risk managers at local level decide
which incident reports areuploaded—encryptedandanonym-
ous—online to the national database. These local systems in
the majority of cases are connected electronically to the na-
tional database. In addition, individual cases can be reported
manually, in French, German or English. The system is comple-
mented by a national group of selected experts in anaesthesi-
ology, which acts as a review board for the published national
recommendations (‘Quick-Alerts’). In addition, a steering com-
mittee of representatives from the SSAR/SGAR and the Patient
Safety Foundation oversees the incoming cases in order to
detect clusters or important single cases that would form the
basis for the alerts. As of September 2012, the database con-
tains .3000 incident reports. Since the start of CIRRNET, 29
Quick-Alerts have been published via national and internation-
al mailing lists to Germany and Austria and in specialist jour-
nals. Various national groups and societies comment on the
alerts before publication, to involve as much expertise as pos-
sible. The Quick-Alerts can be downloaded from the Patient
Safety Foundation’s webpage.
The UK
There has been a national healthcare-wide IRS [the National
Reporting and Learning System (NRLS)] in the UK since 2006.
The NRLS has been collating patient safety incidents from
public hospitals in England and Wales (though reporting is
mandatory only for deaths and severe harm) and is funded
by the National Health Service (NHS). In response to senior
anaesthetists’ opinions that specialty-specific feedback and
incident reporting would help to enhance reporting, the
National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) in conjunction with
the Royal College of Anaesthetists (RCoA) and the Association
of Anaesthetists of Great Britain and Ireland (AAGBI) devel-
oped the ‘Anaesthetic e-Form’. A 3-month pilot in 12 hospitals
was carried out in 2008 by the Safe Anaesthesia Liaison Group
(SALG); its success led to the introduction of the system to the
whole of England and Wales in 2009. Workshops were held
around the country to publicize the new system. The e-Form
aims to capture all incidents related to anaesthesia and, there-
fore, collects a breadth of information. It allowsallmembers of
healthcare staff to report anyproblemsencounteredand is not
limitedonly to critical incidents, leading to information sharing
about problems that may not be immediately obvious to indi-
vidual hospitals.
By the end of June 2012, 1004 reports had been logged on
the system. These have been reviewed by consultant anaes-
thetists from SALG; they are then de-identified and shared na-
tionally in a quarterly summary. If an incident is reported via
the e-Form, the risk management department in the relevant
hospital is automatically notified; however, if an incident is
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reported via the generic NRLS, it will not be copied into the
e-Form data. Thus, the e-Formmechanism contains only a pro-
portionof anaesthetic incidents, but reportsaregenerallyhighly
relevant and of good quality. There is also a rapid-response
system if serious incidents occur. Lessons learnt from the
system are thus available to support individual reflection and
departmental education.18–21 The system complements other
national NHS reporting systems for equipment and drug reac-
tions (through the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regula-
tory Agency, the latter via the long-standing ‘yellow card’
system) and for reactions to blood products. Users of the
e-Forms are directed to use these reporting systems as well if
relevant to the incident reported. We suspect that the use of
several systems leads to someduplication, but also to some fail-
ures to report some incidents at all.
Discussion
We have detailed IRSs from six European countries. Some are
exclusive to anaesthesia, while others aim to cover the whole
of healthcare. We will discuss some of the resulting themes
in the following paragraphs.
Incident reporting had its origins in military aviation,22 but
was adopted into safety-critical industries in the second half
of the 20th century. Anaesthesiology was the first specialty
to make use of the technique in clinical care and, although
the few randomized trials to investigate the effect of incident
reporting in healthcare generally have not suggested great
benefit,23 it has been well received in our specialty.24 The
narrative element makes incident reports accessible and
memorable,25 and the potential for improving the safety and
quality of care seems self-evident. Reporting can be organized
at local,26 27 regional,28 and national levels.2 The systems
described demonstrate that for a system to function effectively,
the different levels need to complement each other. Initial
reporting, incidenthandlingandanalysis,29anddealingwith im-
mediate implications must all happen at local level. However,
national involvement can complement this in a number of
ways—for instance, by establishing a framework to encourage
local reporting or by linking departments together to share
lessons learnt. It also enables wider surveillance of problems,
allowing clusters of reports relating to specific problems to be
identified, and also identifying rare but serious events where
local actionmight be insufficient.
An important aspect of reporting is the safety culturewithin
which the system operates.
Industrial reporting systems promote a ‘no blame’ culture,
where reporting is valued and individuals are disciplined if
they do not report relevant safety problems, rather than if
they do. If healthcare insurers, providers, or both, offer a
no-fault system forcompensation, thiswould also beexpected
to help reporting. However, there is still the perception in
healthcare that acknowledgement of problems might lead to
disciplinary action from an employer or the threat of legal
action fromanaffected patient. This is amajor barrier to report-
ing.30 31 A further issue is whether incident data are disclosable
in legal cases. The situation varies in the different countries
surveyed. In theUK, it differs dependingon the level of reporting
considered. At local level, NHS organizations are obliged to
reveal information on untoward incidents to the patient con-
cerned under a newly introduced ‘duty of candour’. This would
include incident data, although if the incident is made known
to the patient, the report is unlikely to contain any more detail.
At national level, NRLS incidents are anonymized and confiden-
tial andnot available. This is also the case in Denmark. Likewise,
in Switzerland, data are anonymized and it is not possible to
trace reports back to individual clinicians.
The introduction of an incident reporting scheme could in
itselfhelp tochangetheculture for thebetteras, if it is runprop-
erly with appropriate engagement and support from senior
hospitalmanagement, it demonstrates that the ‘no blame’ ap-
proach is real and not an impossible fantasy. Some have sug-
gested that couching the requirement to report incidents in
terms of a professional ethical responsibility is effective32
and indeed, a continual striving for improvement is one of
the hallmarks of excellence in anaesthesia.33–35 The right
culture can also be promoted through practical measures,
such as the de-identification of reporters, protecting reporters
and ‘whistle-blowers’ from unwarranted reprisals, and provid-
ing meaningful feedback. Likewise, national laws also play
their part in incident reporting. In Spain and in Switzerland, it
appears to be necessary to anonymize any nationally shared
incidents as there is no law to protect the person or hospital
reporting,whereas inDenmark the lawencourages healthcare
staff to report incidents. However, as noted above, from this
year, healthcare professionals in Germany are protected by
law if they report incidents.
Government-run systems are more likely to have greater
funding but also more likely to involve patients and the public
in reporting of incidents, analysis of incidents, or both. It
would be wrong, however, to suggest that specialty-specific
and government-run systems are exclusive. It is clear from the
experience in many countries that they work best when they
work together. Thus specialty-specific systems have looked to
government to help promote and fund their activities, while
those running national schemes have realized that proper en-
gagementwith clinical specialties brings its rewards. Finally, na-
tional initiatives are necessary to ensure that where there are
multiple reporting systems, important safety messages are
not lost. For instance, in Finland, Switzerland, and the UK,
there are additional arrangements for reporting problems with
medical equipment, problems with medications, and the
hazards of blood transfusion.
The issueofwhattoreport—that is,howareportable incident
is defined—is important. If there is too loose a definition, many
events that have novaluefind theirway into the system, and on
theotherhand, if there is toostrict acriterion for reporting, there
is a danger that useful lessons will not be learnt. While anaes-
thetistsmayhave theirown,oftenunspoken, operational defini-
tions of what is reportable,36 37 it can help to have an ‘official’
definition. Thus, the Spanish system uses the latest World
Health Organization definition (‘an event or circumstance that
could have resulted, or did result, in unnecessary harm to a
patient’)38 and the UK National Reporting and Learning
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Service is similar (‘anyunintendedorunexpected incidentwhich
couldhaveordid lead toharmforoneormorepatients receiving
NHS care’). This is often glossed over but decisions on definition
can affect the balance between the quantity and quality of inci-
dentswithin thesystem.Inaddition,everydayexperience, in the
UKat least, suggests that it is common for staff to use the IRS to
vent frustrations with inadequate systems; their concerns may
be valid, but such reports can distort the data.
There are judgements to be made, too, at a higher level in
the system; here, the composition and expertise of expert
groupswhoundertake thefilteringand identificationofmater-
ial to be shared, is crucial. A prior decision onwhat level of ‘evi-
dence’ might need to bemet before alerts are issuedmight be
helpful. There is alwaysabalance tobestruckbetweendissem-
inatingearlywarningsofpossible threatsandwaiting forbetter
evidence.
Taxonomies for classification must be decided; if incidents
can be classified according to useful analytical categories
when they are received, it makes further analysis more straight-
forward.At least twogenericanalytical taxonomiesarecurrently
available.39 40
Feedback on reported incidents is also vital.41 Without it,
staff feel that reporting is futile,andthisacts todiscouragereport-
ing still further. It is no surprise, then, that the most successful
systems have given careful thought to multiple methods of dis-
semination. Finally, attention to the various mechanisms of
reporting is important; there are many possible means through
which clinicians can report—paper-based, on-line, smart phone,
etc.—and we do not know which methods work best, either
singly or in combination.
There are alternatives to incident reporting as it exists. The
analysis of routinely collected data42 can help improve the
safety and quality of care; some countries, for instance
Hungary,43 Germany,44 and Denmark,45 have large-scale an-
aesthesia databases already, but these are established for a
different purpose and are complementary to incident report-
ing. They do, however, have some limitations, such as the
need for data cleaning and the absence of explanatory text,
making interpretation more difficult. Further, incident reports
may suffer from bias and one alternative is to observe actual
practice for remediable problems.46 47 However, although
this can be revealing and would certainly get round the
problem of underreporting, it would be highly labour-intensive
and might be seen as both intrusive and threatening by staff.
Finally, we should bear inmind that, although the ‘critical inci-
dents’ we aim to gather and analyse in medicine are negative
events, Flanagan’s original work with the trainers of aircraft
pilots invited themtodescribe desirable traits aswell as poten-
tially dangerous behaviour.22 So perhaps we should aim to en-
courage the promotion of enhancements to safety asmuch as
aspects that threaten it.
Besides all the advantages that incident reporting has at
local level, the national or large-scale collection of critical inci-
dents also has its potential. The main advantage at national
level lies in the learning aspects. Additionally, certain clusters
of similar events that only rarely happen in one place might
perhaps show more readily visible patterns on a larger scale.
Alerting a larger number of anaesthetists to a problem can
potentially prevent it from recurring in other places. The disad-
vantage of a national reporting systemoften lies in the isolation
between the reporter and the incident reporting administrator.
Because of its often anonymous or de-identified approach,
questions from the administrator back to the reporter are
often not possible, hindering the clarification of certain details,
perhaps not initially reported.48 Another aspect of IRSs (either
locally or nationally) is the importance of individual cases.
Table 3 Recommendations for starting a new IRS
Preliminaries
† Do not start the system before explaining the blame-free systems approach of the reporting system to potential reporters
† Start small, gain experience, and only then roll-out the system for wider use
† Do not start without secure financial and staff resources (if possible)
† Define the scope of the project early
† Prepare a ‘starter kit’ for reporters and safety officers
† Establish whether potentially overlapping systems already exist and decide how they will interact with the new system
System features
† Define or adapt the taxonomy to use in the analysis clearly
† Create multiple solutions for data input into the national incident database
† Keep the reporting form concise and clear
Feedback and analysis
† Regularly scan the database for clusters of similar situations or individual important cases
† Schedule feedback to reporters and use all possible means (local meetings, email alerts, bulletins, paper contributions, etc.) to provide it
† Set up an advisory board of experts to judge the relevance of the submitted incidents and invite this advisory board to edit the published
recommendations
Dissemination
† Build local or regional networks to expand system and provide feedback and continuous education to safety officers in a cascade mode
† When writing recommendations, involve the important experts on the relevant topic
† If medical devices are involved, contact the manufacturer and try to publish recommendations jointly with that company
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Individual cases have a powerful narrative element which
makes them memorable, but it must also be remembered
that, if a severe problem is reported, one case is enough to
trigger some action; large case series are not needed.
Whatadvicecanbeoffered to thoseconsideringsettingupa
new system? In general, where systems have arisenwithin the
specialty, they have been pioneered byenthusiasts, and grown
gradually from small beginnings. Nationally designed systems
are usually established by governments and may or may not
have involvement from individual clinical specialties from the
outset (though are more likely to show meaningful results if
they do). Involving potential users is vital.49 National expert
groups that serve as review boards or steering committees are
important for these national systems, because they guarantee
thequalityof the contentof any recommendations issued.Add-
itional recommendations from respondents on starting a new
specialty-specific reporting system are given in Table 3.
Finally, one possibility is to transcend national boundaries
and work at European level to spread the national recommen-
dationsmore widely. Clearly, this would not be an international
reporting system, butwould be conceivedmore as a platform to
share the safety lessons reported through national systems
more widely throughout Europe. This would be in line with the
aimsof theHelsinkiDeclaration for Patient Safety inAnaesthesi-
ology50 and indeed is one of the activities occupying the joint
EuropeanSocietyofAnaesthesiology/EuropeanBoardofAnaes-
thesiology Patient Safety Task Force. Further work is needed to
determine what sort of incidents, national recommendations,
or both should be shared and how this would be achieved in
practice, but given that there is a clear willingness to improve
patient safety still further in anaesthesiology in Europe, this
seems to hold great promise for the future.
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